Paying on the basis of fee-for-service (FFS) is often associated with a risk of overprovision. Policymakers are therefore increasingly looking to other payment schemes to ensure a more efficient delivery of health care. This study tests whether context plays a role for overprovision under FFS. Using a laboratory experiment involving medical students, we test the extent of overprovision under FFS when the subjects face different fee sizes, patient types, and market conditions. We observe that decreasing the fee size has an effect on overprovision under both market conditions. We also observe that patients who are harmed by excess treatment are at little risk of overprovision. Finally, when subjects face resource constraints but still have an incentive to overprovide high-profit services, they hesitate to do so, implying that the presence of opportunity costs in terms of reduced benefits to other patients protects against overprovision. Thus, this study provides evidence that the risk of overprovision under FFS depends on fee sizes, patients' health profiles, and market conditions. 
| INTRODUCTION
In many health care systems, physicians are paid a fee per service (fee-for-service [FFS] ) they provide. FFS is popular because it gives physicians a direct financial incentive to exert effort into health care. However, FFS may lead to overprovision of care making it difficult for policymakers to contain costs (Dranove, 1988) . Consequently, alternative payment forms, such as pay-for-performance, are gaining popularity (Cashin, Chi, Smith, Borowitz, & Thomson, 2014) .
Several studies confirm the existence of overprovision under FFS (e.g., McGuire, 2000; Madden, Nolan, & Nolan, 2005; Van Dijk et al., 2013; Hennig-Schmidt, Selten, & Wiesen, 2011; Brosig-Koch, Hennig-Schmidt, Kairies-Schwarz, & Wiesen, 2017) . These findings may, however, not be robust across patients, fee sizes, and market conditions. Our study examines whether context matters for overprovision to arise under FFS-and thus whether its somewhat poor reputation is always justified. We hypothesise that there exist so-called protective factors against overprovision.
Physicians' utility is typically assumed to depend on both their own net revenue and patients' health (Arrow 1963; Ellis & McGuire, 1986) . In cases where overprovision of care is directly or indirectly 1 detrimental for patients' health, FFS forces physicians to trade-off patients' health for net revenue. Given physicians' altruism (Ellis & McGuire, 1986; Godager & Wiesen, 2013) , we test whether patients' health loss may serve as a protective factor against overprovision under FFS. Under FFS, the fee is typically higher than the marginal costs of care, implying that physicians gain a profit from providing services. When there is a trade-off between patients' health and physicians' profit, a lower fee entails that physicians sacrifice less to prioritise patients' benefit over own profit. Consequently, we test whether lower fees per service provided lead to a reduced overprovision of care.
Overprovision has mainly been observed in settings in which physicians are resource abundant, that is, they have the equipment and personnel required to exhaust their patients' need of care (e.g., Brosig-Koch et al., 2017; Hennig-Schmidt et al., 2011) . However, many physicians experience resource constraints on a daily basis, such that care to one patient comes at the expense of other patients (Kmietowicz, 2016; Majeed, 2017) . Furthermore, resource constraints are expected to tighten even further in the near future (Cooper, Getzen, McKee, & Laud, 2002; Markit, 2017) . Studies have investigated physicians' allocation of resources under constraints but without testing the impact of market conditions and in particular the existence of overprovision under FFS (e.g., Ahlert, Funke, & Schwettmann, 2013; Ahlert & Schwettmann, 2017; Damm, Prenzler, & Zuchandke, 2015; Hurst, Hull, DuVal, & Danis, 2005) . We fill this gap by testing whether overprovision under FFS is reduced when resources are constrained compared with a situation of resource abundance.
An increasing number of studies on the provision of health care make use of fully incentivised laboratory experiments with medical students (Galizzi & Wiesen, 2017) . These studies have confirmed findings from natural experiments, 2 and several have focused in particular on the behavioural reactions to payment schemes (e.g., Hennig-Schmidt et al., 2011; Brosig-Koch et al., 2017; Lagarde & Blaauw, 2017) . The advantage of using the laboratory setting is that it allows for testing the effect of a change in a single feature, which may be difficult in a natural setting where many features may be fixed, unobservable, or change simultaneously. In this study, we therefore also make use of a laboratory experiment to study the importance of context for overprovision under FFS. Section 2 presents our experimental setting, Section 3 our main findings, and Section 4 concludes.
| EXPERIMENTAL SETTING

| Experimental procedure
We ran an incentivised computer-based experiment with 38 medical students (42% male, average age 23). 3 The experiment was run at SamExpri, the experimental laboratory at the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Southern Denmark, using a software developed in Z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007 ). An ex-ante power calculation showed that 37.8 subjects were sufficient to guarantee a power of 0.85. 4 Participation was voluntary, and subjects were paid on average DKK 126 (USD 20), which included a show-up fee of DKK 30 (USD 5). As the experimental framework referred to an interaction between physician and patients, all services that the subjects provided to the fictitious patients were transformed into money that was subsequently donated to two charitable health-related organisations.
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In the experiment, subjects played the role of physicians and were asked to allocate services among different types of patients. Physicians worked for 36 "days" in which they consulted either one or two patients. Each day, physicians could allocate a maximum of 12 units of services in the way they considered best. In the experiment, physicians 1 For example, physical and psychological stress.
2 Natural experiments depart from laboratory experiments in that participants act in their natural environment without knowing that they take part in an experiment (Galizzi & Wiesen, 2017) . 3 Forty students were recruited. One student left before signing the informed consent, whereas data from another were removed from the dataset after the participant self-reported to have incorrectly entered the values in the software. 4 For more details on the power calculation see appendix A1. 5 For more details on the experimental protocol and design see appendices A3 and A4. incurred no costs of treating patients and were paid based on the number of services they were providing. The payment should thus be interpreted as the net revenue generated per service provided. 6 Both at the start and at the end of the experiment, participants filled in a questionnaire proving, among other things, whether their task was understood.
| Definition of patient types
Patients were defined by two characteristics: the minimum number of services needed to exhaust their capacity to benefit (CTB) and whether they were harmed in case of overprovision. We defined overprovision as care exceeding the minimum amount required to exhaust the patient's CTB. Patients could either be characterised by high CTB (high responsiveness to treatment, requiring five services to reach maximum benefit) or low CTB (low responsiveness to treatment, requiring 10 services). The maximum CTB was the same for all types of patients. However, once the maximum CTB was reached, patients could either be unharmed or harmed by overprovision. We defined "harm" as a decrease in the benefit from care when receiving an additional service. We therefore refer to "harmed patients" as those who could potentially be harmed by additional services. This design allowed us to capture how physicians act when facing patients with different health profiles. The benefits from receiving services for each of the four patient types are illustrated in Table 1 .
As we aimed to test how the fee size impacts provision of care, each patient type was associated with two different fees: either $1 (experimental $) per service or $2 per service.
Physicians faced every possible combination of patients (individually and in pairs), for every possible combination of fee size. This resulted in a total of 36 working days; 8 days consulting only one patient and 28 days consulting two patients. The two-patient days illustrated a situation of resource constraints (except for combinations of two high CTB patients) where physicians were forced to trade-off care between patients.
| RESULTS
Initially, we analysed the effect of fee size and patient type in the case when physicians were resource abundant. Subsequently, we measured the overall effect of introducing a resource constraint and analysed whether the role of fee size and patient type changed under this new market condition. 7 The following sections present our results by market condition. A more detailed description of our empirical approach and results can be found in Appendices A1 and A2. 6 In principle, we could have designed the experiment such that each service triggered both a cost and a payment-and let the subject calculate the profit margin, but to minimise the cognitive burden on subjects, we chose this simpler and equivalent design.
7 For completeness, our analyses of "resource constraints" were based on all combinations of two patient types. Appendix A2 provides a detailed analysis of our results for every possible level of constraint; low (no constraint, matches of only high CTB patients), medium (matches of high CTB with low CTB patients), and high (matches of only low CTB patients). Only in a single case was the general result not supported by the subgroup analysis result. In that case, we report the subgroup analysis result in the main text. 
| Resource abundant physicians
Around one third of the patients were overprovided when physicians were resource abundant (mean = 35%; CI = [25%, 46%]) 8 ; however, the magnitude of the overprovision was heterogeneous across patient types. Unharmed patients were overprovided on average 57% of the time, against a 13% of harmed patients (p < 0.001, repeated measures logistic regression). Furthermore, the number of services overprovided was on average 2 units higher for the unharmed patients than for the harmed ones (p < 0.001, two-sided t test 9 ), see Figure 1 . Thus, although overprovision was observed both for harmed and unharmed patients, in this setting, patients' health acted as a protective factor.
Reducing the fee size had some effect on overprovision in particular for the unharmed patients. Among the unharmed, high CTB patients, we observed a statically significant reduction in the frequency of overprovision of 16 percentage points (p = 0.029, repeated measures logistic regression) when the fee size was reduced.
| Resource constrained physicians
When physicians were resource constrained, we observed both overprovision and underprovision. First, we analysed the case of overprovision. On average, only 8% (CI = [6%, 11%]) of patients were overprovided when physicians were resource constrained. The overprovided patients were primarily characterised by being the unharmed, high CTB patients (mean = 24%, CI = [19%, 31%]). However, the harmed, high CTB patients were also slightly overprovided (mean = 5%; CI = [2%, 10%]). For those days where physicians face resource constraints, there was no difference in overprovision between harmed and unharmed patients, see Table A6 in Appendix 2. This finding indicates that patients' health did not serve as a protective factor against overprovision when physicians' resources were limited.
We observed that a lower fee significantly reduced overprovision for the unharmed, high CTB patients, reducing the frequency of overprovision by 14 percentage points (p < 0.001, repeated measures logistic regression). A similar trend was observed for the harmed, high CTB patients, where overprovision was eliminated when the fee was reduced (frequency of overprovision reduced by 6 percentage points, p < 0.001). Thus, when physicians are resource constrained, the fee size may protect patients who are at risk of overprovision, that is, the high CTB patients.
The natural downside to physicians being resource constrained was that some patients received too few services to exhaust their capacity to benefit, as can be observed in Figure 1 . We found that nearly all low CTB patients were underprovided (mean = 97%, CI = [94%, 100%]). However, the risk for low CTB patients decreased by 5 percentage 8 All proportion confidence intervals are Clooper-Pearson binomial CI intervals with standard errors clustered at physician level. 9 Standard errors obtained by bootstrapping (resampling clustered by physician, 10,000 replications). points when physicians received a high fee versus a low fee (p < 0.001, repeated measures logistic regression). We therefore conclude that increasing the fee may serve as a protective factor against underprovision of care to low CTB patients under resource constraint.
| CONCLUSIONS
This laboratory experiment illustrates how context influences the extent of overprovision under FFS. Needless to say, a laboratory setting cannot mimic the real world and thus our results should be interpreted in qualitative terms. Previous laboratory experiments (e.g., Brosig-Koch et al., 2017; Brosig-Koch, Hennig-Schmidt, Kairies-Schwarz, & Wiesen, 2016; Hennig-Schmidt et al., 2011) have successfully confirmed and expanded findings from natural experiments (e.g., Krasnik et al., 1990) . Our study confirms the previous findings of overprovision under FFS. However, it also shows that under resource constraint overprovision is less frequent than under resource abundance. One may argue that this finding is by construction. However, the incentive to provide more services to patients who generated a higher profit was still in effect under resource constraint. Thus, our results imply that "patient opportunity costs" offer protection against overprovision. Moreover, fee size seems to be a useful tool to both reduce the risk of underprovision for low CTB patients and overprovision, in particular for unharmed patients. Finally, when resources were abundant, patients who were harmed by overprovision were less at risk of being overprovided, suggesting that the health risk embedded in FFS could be more limited than previously thought. We conclude that because of these structural protective factors against both under and overprovision, FFS appears better than its reputation in many contexts. Thus, when deciding whether or not to make use of FFS, both the characteristics of the patient population, the fee size, as well as resource availability should be considered.
